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INTRODUCTION 
Like new technologies of the past, databases have caught the world's 
intellectual property system unprepared. I Traditional copyright princi-
ples require a modicum of originality or creativity in the selection or 
arrangement of data in a compilation, or other indicia of creative 
authorship, for the compilation to be copyrightable.2 Yet, this require-
ment may be too stringent for electronic information tools which 
process and store information automatically. Moreover, the require-
mellt may effectively exclude many of the most important commercial 
and scientific databases from copyright protection.3 
1 ANTHONY D'AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
97 (1997); Egbert J. Dommering, Information Law and the Themes of this Booh, in INFORMATION 
LAW TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (Willem F. Korthals Altes et al. eds., 1992); Introduction to 
John H. Burton, Adapting the Intellectual Property System to New Technologies, in GLOBAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 249 (Mitchel B. Waller-
stein et al. eds., 1992); Jerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between Patent and Copyright Para-
digms, 94 COLUM. 1. REv. 2432, 2557 (1994); Lester C. Thurow, Needed: A New S,vstem of Intellectual 
Pr-operty Rights, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 95. 
2 See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of Sept. 9, 1886, 
completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, revised at Berne on Mar. 
20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels on June 26, 1948, revised at 
Stockholm on July 14,1967, revised at Paris on July 24,1971, and amended on Oct. 2, 1979, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), art. 2(5), 2(8), 828 V.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter 
Berne Convention]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC, Part II, 
§ 1, art. 10(2), LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; Existing National and Regional Legislation Concerning Intel-
lectual Property in Databases, "''IPO Doc. DB/IM/2 (June 30, 1997) [hereinafter WIPO Database 
Memorandum]; XIV INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW § 3-14 (Stig Strom-
holm ed., 1990) [hereinafter INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA]; J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intel-
lectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. 1. REv. 51, 72 & n.95 (1997); Reichman, supra note 1, 
at 2491; see also Information Received from Member States of WIPO Concerning Intellectual 
Property in Databases, WIPO Docs. DB/IM/3 and DB/IM/3 Add. (June 15, 1997) (providing 
summary of databases protection in many member states) [hereinafter "'1PO Member State 
Database Protection Information]. 
3 See Reichman, supra note 1, at 2491; Office of Technology Assessment, V.S. Congress, INTEL-
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"[V]ery few people have information. What they actually have is 
data, in such quantities that it causes information overload or black-
OUt."4 The accessibility of such large quantities of data has turned 
information into a "commodity"5 owing to peoples' need to extract a 
needle of desired information from a haystatk of data.6 Information 
about information has become a product whose value can exceed that 
of the information itself.7 Databases8 are the tools that provide infor-
mation about information; and have become the new building blocks 
of knowledge.9 Databases are, as such, indispensable to the American 
economy.lO 
Tremendous resources are often invested to assemble large quanti-
ties of information into a database. ll Nevertheless, the resulting prod-
uct is vulnerable to being quickly and inexpensively copied using 
today's digital technology. 12 Moreover, because of widespread access to 
global information networks, pirated copies of a database can be dis-
seminated in a matter of moments to millions of people across the 
globe.13 Consequently, compilers of un copyrightable databases face 
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 252-53 (1987) [here-
inafter OTA Report). 
4 PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE 347 (1992). 
5 Egbert J. Dommering, An Introduction to Information Law Works of Fact at the Crossroads of 
Freedorn and Protection, in PROTECTING WORKS OF FACT 1 (Egbert J. Dommering & P. Bernt 
Hugenholtz eds., 1991). 
6 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 64-65. 
7 NICHOLAS P. NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 154 (1995). 
8 This Note defines database in broad terms to include both electronic and non-electronic 
compilations of information. As used herein, a "database" is a collection of independent works, 
data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by 
electronic or other means. To distinguish databases which would qualifY for copyright protection 
in most jurisdictions from those which would not, the term "noncreative database" is used to refer 
to databases that do not contain even a minimum level of originality, creativity or expression of 
personality in the selection, coordination or arrangement of their contents and hence, are 
typically uncopyrightable. 
9 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA 
17 (1997) [hereinafter BITS OF POWER]. 
10 See 143 Congo Rec. E2000-02 (daily ed. Oct. 9,1997) (statement of Rep. Coble). 
11 See Collections ofInformation Antipiracy Act, S. 2291, 105th Cong., 2d. Sess. § 2 (1998); The 
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act: Hearing on H.R 2652 Before the Subcornrn. on Cts. and 
Intellectual Prap., 105th Congress 14 (1997) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights 
for the United States) [hereinafter Hearings); Dennis S. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third 
Intellectual Praperty Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2594, 2594 (1994). 
12 See id. 
13 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 67 & n.69. 
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diminishing prospects of commercial success unless they obtain inter-
national standards of protection to thwart pirating of their products. 14 
However, it is a mistake to think that intellectual property rights for 
database compilers are the only avenue of protection against harm. IS 
The positive law has long recognized protection from harm for a 
variety of nonowned interests: examples range from ducks not yet 
caughtlG to a barber's customersP Thus, an interest is not disqualified 
from protection simply because it is not ownable in the usual sense. IS 
This Note argues that protection of non creative databases is best 
based on unfair competition law, under a doctrine of misappropria-
tion. 19 Although solutions based on unfair competition law have gen-
erally been downplayed or criticized because they are a "haphazard 
protection whimsically afforded,"20 a law based on misappropriation 
particularly tailored to the context of databases21 will ameliorate the 
legal uncertainty. 
This Note further argues that protection of noncreative databases 
under a doctrine of misappropriation provides a better basis for har-
monization than the grant of an intellectual property right. The norm 
underpinning misappropriation is recognized across cultures whereas 
a right in noncreative works is not.22 Considering that many of the 
14 See S. 2291 at § 2; D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 1; John A. Armstrong, Trends in Global 
Science and Technology and "-hat They Mean for Intellectual Property Systems, in GLOBAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 204-06; 
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 67 & n.69; Thurow, supra note 1, at 100. 
15 See D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 1, at 31. 
16 Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East 573,575,577-78, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128, 1129 (K.B. 1707). 
17 Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145,119 N.W. 946, 948 (1909). 
18 See D'AMATO & LONG, supra note I, at 31. 
19 The "doctrine of misappropriation" is not a clearly articulated one. See, e.g., G.M. Hunsucker, 
The Eumpean Database Directive: Regional Stepping Stone to an International Model?, 7 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 697, 720 (1997); Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine 
as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REv. 875, 875 (1991). The doctrine, 
by a realist definition, is deployed by the courts to prevent "piracy" and "dirty tricks" in commer-
cial settings. See, e.g., Hunsucker, supra at 720; Raskind, supra at 875. The doctrine has its origins 
in International News Service 11. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S. Ct. 68 (1918), and has found 
its most recent expression in National Basketball Ass'n 11. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
20 See Hunsucker, supra note 19, at 703; Reichman, supra note 1, at 2476; Raskind, supra note 
19, at 881 & n.36. 
21 See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Misappropriation, 17 DAYTON L. REv. 885, 928 (1992); 
Raskind, supra note 19, at 880-81. 
22 There is general agreement that a work deserves to be protected by copyright only if it 
presents a minimum of originality, creativity or expression of personality. See, e.g., Berne Conven-
tion, supra note 2, art. 2(5); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, Part II, § 1, art. 10(2); WlPO 
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world's political cultures differ widely from Western norms and that 
concepts of property are shaped by the political cultures out of which 
they arise, it is inappropriate to assume that intellectual property laws 
will or should be the same from one country to another.23 Harmoniza-
tion of disparate intellectual property systems based on contradictory 
philosophical or cultural bases is only viable when each system can find 
an acceptable basis in its own philosophy for the necessary changes.24 
Therefore, efforts to revise existing intellectual property systems must 
consider the effect of the revisions not just on intellectual property 
laws but also on the historical and cultural treatment of ownership and 
use of in tangible property, as well as norms on the protection of public 
access to ideas, information and expressions.25 A law based on misap-
propriation provides a viable solution to harmonization based on an 
accepted philosophical basis: expressed metaphorically by the U.S. 
Supreme Court as reaping what another has sown,26 in German aca-
demic circles as "ploughing with another's heifer"27 or inJapan as "Hito 
no fundoshi de sumo wo toru" (to wrestle in another's loin cloth) .28 
Part I of this Note provides a brief background on the vulnerability 
of databases. In addition, Part I discusses the detriments to society that 
can result from proprietary rights in information. Part II explores the 
approach taken by several foreign nations, the EU and international 
community to the protection of noncreative databases. Part III dis-
cusses current U.S. law and a pending congressional bill, the Collec-
tions of Information Antipiracy Act, S. 2291, on the protection of 
noncreative databases. Finally, Part IV of this Note discusses how inter-
national protection of noncreative databases would be best effectuated 
under a doctrine of misappropriation and proposes that a promising 
and pragmatic model for harmonization of noncreative database pro-
tection can be fashioned from S. 2291. 
Database Memorandum, supra note 2, at 7-8; INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 2 at § 3-14; 
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 72 & n.95. 
23 See D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 1, at 37. 
24 See id. at 413; see also james E. Armst1"Ong III, Comparative National Approaches to Intellectual 
Praperty Rights: japan, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 157-58 (discussing difficulty in harmonization of U.S. and 
japanese patent laws). 
25 See D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 1, at 71. 
26 See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. at 239, 39 S. Ct. at 72. 
27 See Guntram Rahn & Christopher Heath, What Is japanese About the japanese Unfair Compe-
tition Act, 25 INT'L REv. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 343, 349 (1994) (citing judges 14:18). 
28 See id. at 349. 
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I. BACKGROUND ON DATABASES 
The term database, broadly, includes both electronic and non-elec-
tronic compilations of information. 29 In this sense, "databases" have 
been with us for millennia and, arguably, are a foundation of civiliza-
tion.30 Yet, developments in computer software and digital technology 
have lead to the creation of many commercially and scientifically im-
portant databases which are excluded from copyright protection in 
most jurisdictions because they are "noncreative," i.e., they lack even 
a minimum of originality, creativity or expression of personality in the 
selection, coordination or arrangement of their contents.3] 
A. Vulnerability of Databases 
Only modest familiarity with the capabilities of digital technology is 
required to understand the vulnerability of databases to market-de-
structive approbations.32 The digital technologies that enhance a data-
base compiler's power to collect and disseminate data also enhance a 
second-corner's power to cheaply copy or manipulate the contents and 
disseminate the resulting products to large numbers of people.33 The 
motive for such approbations is most often either an attempt to obtain 
a commercial free-ride on the work of others34 or to simply distribute 
information out of a belief it should be free, i.e., information samari-
tanism. 35 Regardless of the motives, such approbations discourage in-
29 See supra note 8. 
30 Ancient examples of "databases" include tables charting the position of stars over a night or 
throughout the year; arguably this data permitted the development of civilization by enabling the 
prediction of such important events as the flood of the Nile. See ADOLF ERMAN, LIFE IN ANCIENT 
EGYPT 349 (Helen Mary Tirard trans., Dover Publications 1971) (1894) (providing an example 
of stich an ancient Egyptian "database"-dating from circa. 1100 B.C.). 
31 See Reichman, supra note I, at 2491; OTA Report, supra note 3; see, e.g., supra note 22 and 
accompanying text. 
32 See S. 2291, supra note 11, at § 2(6), (12); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 66; see, 
e.g., Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliment and of the Council of II March 1996 on the 
Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 OJ. (L77) 20, recitals 7-12 [hereinafter Database Directive]. 
33 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 66--67 and n.67 citing Information Industry 
Association, Database Protection: An Industry Perspective on the Issues (Aug. 1995). 
34 See, e.g., CCC Information Sen-., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 72 
(2d Cir. 1994) (stating that CCC took "virtually the entire compendium" of Maclean's used car 
valuations and "effectively offer[ed] to sell its customers Maclean's Red Book through CCC's 
database") . 
35 An "information samaritan" is one who extracts data from a database without paying for it 
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vestment in database compilation and result in a lower supply of data-
bases.36 
A lower supply of databases can have adverse effects on technological 
progress.37 Technology progresses by using existing knowledge and 
adding to it. 38 Databases are powerful tools which enable users to more 
efficiently access and organize existing knowledge. 39 Thus, access to an 
appropriate database increases a user's ability to add to the existing 
stock of knowledge.40 However, the lower the supply of databases, the 
lower the probability that an appropriate database will be available. 
Furthermore, lower supply creates the prospect that some information 
will not be available in any database. 4! Consequently, as essential tools 
for improving productivity, advancing education and creating a more 
informed citizenry, a lower supply of databases can have a strong 
impact on technological progress. 4~ 
B. Detriments oj Protection 
Even though a plentiful supply of databases is important, the grant 
of a property right in noncreative databases would be detrimental to 
the public interest.43 In particular, the grant of a property right in 
and, for non-economic reasons, makes it available to the public. Possibly, "information samari-
tans" act in accordance with the hacker's ethic: "Access to computers-and anything which might 
teach you something about the way the world works-should be unlimited and total," and "All 
information should be free." See FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS 176 (1994) (quoting 
Dorothy Denning's presentation of a Digital Equipment Corp. study of hackers at the National 
Computer Security Conference, Washington, D.C., 1-4 October 1990); see, e.g., U.S. v. LaMacchia, 
871 F. Supp. 535, 536-37 (D. Mass. 1994) (involving an MIT student who uploaded commercial 
software onto electronic bulletin board, to be downloaded for free, and encouraged others to do 
the same. Although unmotivated by any desire for financial gain, his actions cost the affected 
software makers over $1 million in losses). 
36 See S. 2291, supra note 11, at § 2(5), (14); C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the 
Misappropriation Doctrine: Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. 
LJ. 55, 59-62, 63 (1987). For an indication that the supply of databases has slowed since Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., discussed infra Part III.A.I. see Linda R. Raber, Database 
Protection, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 17, 1997, at 27, 28. 
37 See supra note 10. 
38 See BITS OF POWER, supra note 9. 
39 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 64-65. 
40 See BITS OF POWER, supra note 9, at 4-5; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 64-65; see 
also S. 2291, at § 2. 
41 SeeS. 2291, supra note 11, at § 2(14); Raber, supra note 36, at 28. 
42 See supra note 10. 
43 The term "public interest" as used in this Note connotes Constitutionally mandated goals 
and protected interests. Specifically, the purpose of copyright "[ tl 0 promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts" and the 1st Amendment's protection of "the freedom of speech". See 
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noncreative databases is antithetical to the sine qua non of progress in 
science: the full and open exchange of information.44 Basic science 
needs abundant, unrestricted flows of data at prices it can afford 
because the acquisition of scientific knowledge is a cumulative process 
that depends on the ability of researchers to continually collect and 
share data.45 When data becomes too expensive, scientific research 
suffers irremediable harm.41i 
A striking example of the harm that can result from a grant of 
proprietary rights in data is the privatization of data from the Landsat 
series of remote sensing satellites.47 Under the management of the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Landsat data and 
images were originally made available to all users at marginal COSt.48 In 
1984, Congress passed the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization 
Act which privatized the system49 and in 1985 the contract for the 
Landsat system was awarded to a joint venture of Hughes and RCA 
called the Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT). 50 
Following privatization, the prices of Landsat data increased from 
approximately $400 to $4,400 per image.51 Few academic or inde-
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 & amend. I. The restriction of the flow of news under a "property 
right" in database information implicates 1st Amendment concerns in the U.S. See, e.g., Harper 
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 266, 298-97, 302 (1964); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual 
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 270 (1992); Jane C. Ginsburg, No 
"Sweat"? Copyright And Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 
COLUM. L. REv. 338, 384-87 & n.220 (1992). These concerns, however, are not unique to the 
U.S.; similarly, strong "property rights" in database information raise concerns in Europe with 
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. See 
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221, 230, Europ. T.S. No.5. Article 10 provides, in pertinent part, that: "[elveryone has 
the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include the freedom to hold opinions and 
impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of fron-
tiers." Nevertheless, 1st Amendment and freedom of expression concerns are beyond the scope 
of this Note. 
44 See Information Meeting on Intellectual Property in Databases: Observation submitted by the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO), WIPO Doc. DB/IM/4, passim (September 4, 1997); 
BITS OF POWER, supra note 9, at 3; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 121. 
45 See BITS OF POWER, supra note 9, at 121; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 121. 
46 See BITS OF POWER, supra note 9, at 121-23 (1997). 
47 See id. 
48 See id. at 121. 
49 See id. at 121-23. 
50 See BITS OF POWER, supra note 9, at 121. 
51 See id. at 121. 
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pendent researchers could afford these new prices.52 The high data 
costs hampered, inter alia, the ability to conduct low-cost basic research 
from which many technological innovations have come and brought 
some areas of research to a complete halt. 53 
II. FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL MODELS 
Several nations have legislation which addresses the protection of 
databases.54 This section will examine that of Japan , the Nordic nations, 
and the European Union (EU). It will also briefly describe the most 
prominent multilateral treaty concerning copyright, the Berne Con-
vention.55 These specific foreign models are chosen because they are 
representative of the spectrum of protection afforded, or not afforded, 
to noncreative databases. Japan, at one end of the spectrum, does not 
recognize copyright protection for noncreative databases. It has what 
can be characterized as a "hard to copyright/easy to infringe" system.56 
On the other end of the spectrum is the EU. It has created in its 
Database Directive an easily accessible sui generis protection that is, 
nevertheless, still easy to infringe.57 The Nordic nations' approach 
occupies the middle. 
This section also examines legal norms in Japan that are analogous 
to the doctrine of misappropriation and the norms behind the EU's 
Database Directive. Japan and the EU are chosen because eventual 
harmonization among U.S., Japan and EU law appears the most feasi-
ble.58 Collectively, the U.S., Japan and EU possess nearly all the tech-
nological capacity in the world and thus, have a natural and strong 
interest in protecting their technological and informational assets.59 
52 See id. 
53 See id. at 122-23. 
54 See WlPO Database Memorandum, supra note 2, passim. 
55 See infra Parts Il.A, II.B, Il.C and II.D. 
56 "Hard to copyright" because Japanese courts may require a level of creativity in the work 
which emphasizes novelty. See Dennis S. Kaljala & Keiji Sugiyama, Fundamental Concepts in 
Japanese and American Copyright Law, 36 AM. J. COMPo 1. 613 (1988), reprinted in COMPARATIVE 
LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN, 715, 719, 720, 724, 726 (Kenneth 1. Port ed., 1996). 
"Easy to infringe" because Japanese law lacks a general fair use defense against a charge of 
infringement. Id. 
57 See Infra Part II.C. 
58 See Mitchel B. Wallerstein et aI., GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 185. 
59 See id. 
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A. Japan 
The Japanese legal system, while technically following a Civil Law 
model, also contains elements of Common Law as well as a traditional 
legal system.5O Thus, although Japanese copyright law follows the Civil 
Law model,61 judicial precedent has defined the outlines of this legal 
regime.62 The Japanese Copyright Law protects "works" (chosakubutsu) 
in which "thoughts or sentiments are expressed in a creative way" and 
"fall within the literary, scientific, artistic or musical domain. "63 Judicial 
precedents have created a "hard to copyright/easy to infringe" sys-
tem. 54 
1. Copyright and Unfair Competition 
Under Article 12(1) of the Japanese Copyright Act, compilation 
works (henshu-chosakubutsu) are protected independently of the mate-
rial constituting the compilation if they possess some creativity in the 
selection or arrangement of the materia1.65 Similarly, under the 1986 
Amendment of the Copyright Act, databases (detabesu) are protected 
if they evidence some creativity. 56 However, the materials of which they 
60 See Kenneth L. Port, Introduction to the Study of Japanese Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW 
AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN, supra note 56, at 3; HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 36 (1992). 
Custom is also an important part of japanese law. For example, "the Law on the Application of 
Law (harm) provides that where custom is not contrary to public order nor morals it has an effect 
equivalent to law, on the condition that the law expressly provides for the custom to be applied, 
or where there is no law on the issue." See HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 36, 60 (1992). 
61 The first copyright law of japan was enacted in 1899, shortly before japan's accession to the 
Berne Convention. See ODA, supra note 60, at 251-52. The present copyright law of japan traces 
its roots to the 1970 Copyright Act and major amendments in 1985 and 1986 which, respectively, 
extended copyright protection to computer programs and databasl"s. See id. 
62 See Kenneth L. Port, Foreword to Dennis S. Karjala & Keiji Sugiyama, Fundamental Concepts 
in Japanese and American Copyright Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN 
JAPAN, supra note 56, at 715; ODA, supra notl" 60, at 36. 
63 Seejapanese Copyright Law, arts. 1 and 2(1) (i), translated in Karjala & Sugiyama, supra note 
56, 36 AM. J. COMPo L. at 616, reprinted in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN 
JAPAN at 717. 
64 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
65 Article 12 (1) of the japanese Copyright Act provides: "Compilations which possess ul"ativity 
in the selection or arrangement of the materials (sozai) shall be protectl"d as works of authorship." 
Seejapanesl" Copyright Law, art. 12(1), translated in TERUO DOl, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRO-
TECTION AND MANAGEMENT-LAW AND PRACTICE IN JAPAN 64, (1992); translated in Karjala & 
Sugiyama, supra note 56, 36 AM. J. COMPo L. at 617, reprinted in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAw AND 
THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN at 718. 
66 See Act for Partial Amendment of the Copyright Act, Article 12(1), Law No. 64 of 1986, 
translated in DOl, supra note 65, at 113 & n.36; ODA, supra note 60, at 253. 
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are composed may not be works of authorship67 and no other special 
laws regulate the extraction of data from a database. 58 
The decision in Sakimura v. Yashiro (the Telephone Directory case) 
makes clear that protection is not afforded to non creative databases 
and illustrates the "hard to copyright" system.59 Similar to the facts in 
the U.S. Supreme Court case Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone,7° the 
plaintiff had compiled a telephone directory in which telephone sub-
scribers were classified in accordance with their type of business and 
listed alphabetically.71 The court denied copyright protection for plain-
tiff's directory because a directory of identical arrangement had been 
published some years before and hence, the plaintiff's directory con-
tained no "new thought."72 The court reasoned that the fundamental 
concept of plaintiffs directory-arranging telephone numbers in al-
phabetical order-was identical to the earlier work. 73 Thus, plaintiffs 
directory was held uncopyrightable because it was not "expressed in a 
creative way."74 
The Japanese Unfair Competition Act of 1993 adopts a general-pur-
pose anticopying norm. 75 The law "expressly targets wholesale or slavish 
imitation that deprives investors of a return on their investment by 
unduly shortening the life cycle of innovative goods. "76 However, the 
legislative history indicates that ideas and concepts remain unpro-
67 See Articles 12(2), 12(2), translated in 001, supra note 65, at 64 & n.16, 113 & n.36. 
68 See Peter Knight, Recent Developments in Information Technology Law in the Asia-Pacific Region 
(Part I), 14 No.3 COMPUTER LAw. 19, 25 (1997). 
69 See Kaljala & Sugiyama, supra note 56, 36 AM. J. COMPo L. at 631 & n.80, reprinted in 
COMPARATIVE LAW: LAw AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN at 724. 
70 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (discussed 
infra Part III Al ) . 
71 See Dennis S. Kaljala & Keiji Sugiyama, Fundamental Concepts in Japanese and American 
Copyright Law, in COMPARATIVE LAw: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN, supra note 56, at 
724. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 See The Unfair Competition Act Uapanl, Law No. 47/1993, May 19, 1993, Section 2(3), 
translated in Rahn & Heath, supra note 27, at 352-53; Reichman, supra note 1, at 2475. 
76 Reichman, supra note 1, at 2475; see also The Unfair Competition Act Uapan], Law No. 
47/1993, May 19, 1993, Section 2(3). Section 2(3) provides: "Definition of prohibited acts: .... 
(3)The act of transferring or dealing in (including the display for such purposes), exporting or 
importing goods that imitate the form of another party's goods (excluding such forms that are 
commonly used for such or similar goods or that have an identical or similar function or effect), 
provided that not more than three years from the date of first commercial circulation have 
elapsed.", translated in Rahn & Heath, supra note 27, at 352-53. 
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tected.77 Thus, non creative compilations of information or databases 
do not enjoy any protection under either Japanese Copyright or Unfair 
Competition law. 78 
2. Norms Analogous to the Doctrine of Misappropriation 
"A central tenet of Confucianism is that an idea cannot be owned 
but must be shared. "79 The very idea of intellectual property rights tied 
to a single individual or company is alien to ancient Japanese culture.80 
Even in the present day many Japanese view with disdain the American 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. 8l However, the misappro-
priation rationale disapproves of the exploitation of another's achieve-
ment. It is succinctly stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in International 
News Service v. Associated Press as one should not "reap where [one] 
has not sown."82 The Japanese, too, understand this rationale, and 
express it with the Japanese proverb "Hito no jundoshi de sumo wo toru" 
(to wrestle in another's loin cloth).83 
An analysis of Japanese trademark cases concerning the "danger of 
confusion" (kondo no osore) reveals thatJapanese law is apt to recognize 
the free-ride (tandanori) as misappropriation.84 A necessary element of 
a case of unfair exploitation of another's achievements under the 
Unfair Competition Act is that a "danger of confusion" exists.85 "In fact, 
these cases do not concern an actual danger of confusion, but a 
'free-ride' on famous marks."86 Although the decisions do not always 
explicitly refer to the danger as being one also of "free-riding," legal 
77 See Reichman, supra note 1, at 2475. 
78 See The Unfair Competition Act Uapan], Law No.4 7/1993, May 19, 1993; Act for Partial 
Amendment of the Copyright Act, Law No. 64 of 1986. 
79 D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 1, at 409. 
80 See D'hIATO & LONG, supra note 1, at 409; WARSHOFSKY, supra note 35, at 11. 
81 Akio Morita, Chairman of Sony Corp., summed up the disdain which many Japanese feel 
toward American enforcement of intellectual property rights with the following anecdote: "vVhen 
I was living in the United States, my child got sick, so I called my doctor. Our American doctor 
gave us instructions on what to do and what kind of medication to take. Now in Japan, you 
wouldn't expect anything else to happen-but in the States, I received a bill for that telephone 
call from my doctor. Now this tells you they don't give out any intelligence for free." D'AMATO & 
LONG, supra note 1, at 409. 
82 See International News Service, 248 U.S. at 239. 
83 See Rahn & Heath, supra note 27, at 349. 
84 See id. 
8!iSee The Unfair Competition Act Uapan], Law No. 47/1993, May 19,1993, Article J(J)(l) 
and (2), translated in DOl, supra note 65, at 341. 
86 Rahn & Heath, supra note 27, at 351. 
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scholarship widely regards the concepts of dilution and "free-ride" as 
being at the heart of several of the courts' decisions,s7 
In the case of famous trademarks,japanese courts have analyzed the 
"danger of confusion" in two senses: "narrow" and "broad, "88 In the 
narrow sense, japanese courts reason that a lack of identity or similarity 
of goods or business would not mislead consumers about a product's 
origin because consumers will not associate, and thereby confuse, the 
trademark with the dissimilar product.89 Hence, the focus is "narrow" 
because it only looks at the characteristics and uses of the products. 9o 
In contrast, under an analysis conducted in the broad sense,japanese 
courts reason that consumers, while not confusing the dissimilar prod-
ucts, may assume a connection between the enterprises in question.9! 
Hence, the focus is "broad" because it looks at perceptions of the whole 
market and relationships between enterprises.92 
A case which makes clear the courts' censure of "free-riding" is KK 
Yashica v. Daiya Kogyo KK93 In Yashica, the defendant enterprise 
registered94 and placed the exact mark (YASHICA) of the plaintiff on 
87 See id. at 351 & n.28. 
88 See id. at 350. 
89 See id. 
90 For example, under a narrow analysis a trademark on shaving products would not be 
confused with one on writing instruments. 
91 For example, the concepts of dHution and "free-ride" better explain the Tokyo District Court's 
finding in ParnolandDisney, 515 HANREI TAIMUZU 210 (Tokyo Dist. Ct.,Jan. 18, 1984), ofa danger 
of confusion between the "Disney" mark of US Walt Disney Productions and aJapanese sexshop 
called "POl'noland Disney." According to the court, a danger of confusion existed because 
Disneyland symbolized a world of children's dreams, whereas the defendant promised to fulfill 
adult dreams. See Rahn & Heath, supra note 27, at 350 & n.26. Similarly, dilution and "free-ride" 
better explain the decision in Disney Pachinko, 750 HANREI TAIMUZU 238 (Fukuoka Dist. Ct., April 
2, 1990), another case concerning the "Disney" mark and a pachinko shop called "Disney 
Pachinko." See id. at 350 n.27. In Disney Pachinko, although the Fukuoka District Court expressly 
stated that hardly any Japanese would mistakenly assume a connection between the Walt Disney 
Corporation and a pinball machine gambling parlor, the Court nevertheless affirmed that a 
danger of cOilfusion existed. See id. 
92 Thus, under a broad analysis consumers could percieve a connection between a shaving 
product and a writing instrument because enterprises exist that produce both, e.g., "BIC." 
93 See KK Yashica v. Daiya Kogyo KK (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1966). Translated by Kenneth 
L. Port, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN, supra note 56, at 801-03. 
94Japanese Trademark Law is a first to register system except in certain cases of well known 
marks. See Trademark Law UapanJ, §§ 18(1), 32(1), Law No. 127 of April 13, 1959, as last 
amended by Law No. 65 of 1991. In addition, under Japanese Law, an application for trademark 
covers only one class of goods. See id. at § 6(1). See Kenneth L. Port, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW 
AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN, supra note 56, at 794; PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN ASIA-PACIFIC 86 (Diana Sharpe ed., 1989). 
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its cosmetic packaging.95 In contrast, the plaintiffs enterprise primarily 
consisted of the sale and manufacture of cameras and camera equip-
ment-for which it was widely known.96 The court recognized that 
consumers would not confuse the products of the enterprises (i.e., 
there was no "danger of confusion" in the narrow sense) but did not 
address the "danger of confusion" in the broad sense.97 Instead, the 
Tokyo District Court reasoned that defendant's registration of a mark 
identical to the plaintiffs, at a time when the plaintiffs mark graced 
very popular products, was an action clearly intended to free ride on 
plaintiffs mark.98 The court further reasoned that such a free ride was 
a violation of the Unfair Competition Law sufficient to create an 
exception to the defendant's right to use its registered mark.99 Thus, 
the Tokyo District Court held that a non-competitor should not be 
allowed to use an exact mark, even on distinct products where there 
is no danger of confusion, because this could result in "free-riding" on 
the goodwill of the original trademark registrant. lOO 
3. Summary 
Japan does not grant a copyright to noncreative databases and main-
tains a "hard to copyright" system; nevertheless, Japanese law and 
culture possess a legal norm on which to base protection of noncopy-
rightable databases.1ol The Japanese courts have been willing to step 
outside strict trademark law to prevent use of famous trademarks, even 
when there is no "danger of confusion," under a theory that "free-rid-
ing" on the goodwill created by another is an unfair competitive act.102 
The Japanese courts have, in colloquial terms, found "Hito no fundoshi 
de sumo wo toru" (to wrestle in another's loin cloth) impermissible. 103 
Accordingly, a law prohibiting acts which pirate the contents of an 
un copyrightable database and amount to a "free-ride" on the efforts 
95 See KK Yashica v. Daiya Kogyo KK (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1966). Translated by Kenneth 
L. Port, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN, supra note 56, at 802. 
96 See id. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See KK. Yashica v. Daiya Kogyo KK (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1966). Translated by Kenneth 
L. Port, in COMPARATIVE LAw: LAw AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN, supra note 56, at 803. 
100 See id. 
101 See Rahn & Heath, supra note 27, at 349. 
102 See supra Part II.A.2. 
103 See Rahn & Heath, supra note 27, at 349. 
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of the compiler has a recognized basis in Japanese legal and cultural 
norms. 
B. The Nordic Nations 
In contradistinction to Japanese law, the Nordic nations-Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden-have instituted a system of 
"neighboring rights"104 to protect investments of capital and labor in 
noncreative databases from free-riders. 105 The Copyright Acts of all 
five Nordic nations contain provisions which protect noncreative com-
pilations of information.106 Together, these provisions have been called 
the "Nordic Catalogue Rule."107 The Nordic Catalogue Rule originates 
from a 1951 proposal for joint copyright legislation in Denmark, Fin-
land and Norway.IOS The 1975 Icelandic provision is the most recent 
one, whereas the others date from 1960-61.109 
The acts differ in scope somewhat from one Nordic nation to an-
other, but their common aim is to make the law uniformly applicable 
to 'catalogue matter' wherein unlawful reproduction is punishable as 
a copyright infringement. llo The preparatory documents to the Copy-
right Acts indicate the subject matter intended for protection includes 
sale and exhibition catalogues, even lists of names or persons. lll For 
example, local telephone directories have been protected in a number 
of cases. ll2 In contrast to copyright protection, the subject matter of 
\o4The term "neighboring rights" is short for "rights neighboring on copyright" and refers to 
rights that provide protection short of copyright against certain acts of unfair competition akin 
to copyright infringement. See, e.g., D'AMATO & LONG, supra note I, at 97-98. 
\05 See Gunnar W.G. Kamell, The Nordic Catalogue Rule, in PROTECTING WORKS OF FACT 67-68 
(Egbert]. Dommering & P. Bemt Hugenholtz eds., 1991). 
\06The provisions are in the following sections of the respective Copyright Acts: Denmark § 49, 
Finland § 49, Iceland § 50, Norway § 43, and Sweden § 49. See id. at 67, 68; WIPO Database 
Memorandum, supra note 2, at 12. An exanlple is § 49 of the Swedish Copyright Act of 1960 
which reads in pertinent part: "Catalogues, tables, and similar compilations in which a large 
number of particulars have been summarized may not be reproduced without the consent of the 
producer before ten years have elapsed from the year in which the production was published." 
See Kamell, supra note 105, at 67, 68. 
\07 See id.; WIPO Database Memorandum, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
\08 See Kamell, supra note 105, at 67, 68. Besides the EU and the Nordic Nations, statutory 
protection for noncreative databases exists only in Mexico. See WIPO Database Memorandum, 
supra note 2, at 12-14. 
\09 See Kamell, supra note 105, at 67; see generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EUROPE 
101, 125,219,333, 397 (George Metaxas-Maranghidis ed., 1995). 
110 See Kamell, supra note 105, at 67,68; WIPO Database Memorandum, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
III See Karnell, supra note 105, at 67, 70; WIPO Database Memorandum, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
112 See id. 
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catalogue protection does not require creativeness manifested in either 
individuality or in originality.ll3 In addition, the catalogue rule has 
gained general acceptance as a means of protection for databases, thus 
guarding them against unlawful reproduction. 1I4 
Although the Nordic catalogue rules are contained within the "Copy-
right Acts" of the Nordic nations, the protection given is intended to 
be of competition law character rather than copyright.ll5 The aim is to 
protect enterprises that have expended capital and labor on the pro-
duction of "catalogue matter" (e.g., a database) from plagiarism and 
ensuing unfair competition by means of unwarranted reproduction. ll6 
Thus, in order to be protected, the collection must list a "large number 
of particulars" (pieces of information).117 This criterion denies protec-
tion to compilations which are too easily achieved, at too small a cost 
in capital and labor while it ensures protection of substantial invest-
ments of capital and labor. liS 
The Nordic Catalogue Rule provides an alternative protection to 
noncreative databases under a neighboring rights regime and eases the 
pressure on copyright law to protect noncreative databases that other-
wise lack protection against commercial piracy.ll'l Thus, by acting as a 
"legal relief valve" the approach of the Nordic Catalogue Rule lessens 
(l) the risk that courts will banalize the creativity requirement, so as 
not to leave a compiler's substantial investments in capital and labor 
wholly unprotected; and (2) the exigency to extend a sui generis copy-
right to noncreative databases. 12o 
113 See Karnell, supra note 105, at 67,68; ""'IPO Database Memorandum, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
114 See Karnell, supra note 105, at 67, 72. 
115 See id. at 67, 70. 
116 See id. 
117 See id.; WIPO Database Memorandum, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
118 See id. at 67,71. 
119 See Karnell, supra note 105, at 67, 70; Reichman, supra note 1, at 2493. 
120 See Karnell, supra note 105, at 67, 70; Reichman, supra note 1, at 2493; see, e.g., Bellsouth 
Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 957, 958 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(finding selection of geographic boundaries and business classifications in a classified business 
directory (yellow pages) sufficient creativity to make directory copyrightable), vacated and reh 'g 
en banc granted, 977 F.2d 1435, 1435 (11 th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 999 F.2d 1436, 1443, 1445 (11 th Cir. 
1993) (finding selections obvious because dictated by functional considerations and common 
industry practice and hence, insufficient to make directory copyrightable); if. Key Publications, 
Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enter., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (1991) (finding classified business 
telephone directory, i.e., white and yellow pages, for New York City's Chinese-American connnu-
nity copyrightable on grounds that there is sufficient creativity in deciding which business 
categories to include). 
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C. The EU Database Directive 
On January 1,1998, the long awaited Directive on the Legal Protec-
tion of Databases ("Database Directive") entered into force. 121 The 
Database Directive was enacted by the EU on March 11, 1996, after 
nearly eight years of discussion. 122 The primary purpose of the Data-
base Directive is to stimulate investment in databases and thereby 
increase the European share of a market which is a "cornerstone" to 
the economic development plans of the EU.123 This section discusses 
the Database Directive as it applies to noncreative databases and the 
normative reasons behind its provisions. 
1. Database Directive 
The Database Directive defines a database as "a collection of inde-
pendent works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or 
methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other 
means,"124 but does not require the data contained within the database 
"to have been physically stored in an organized matter. "125 This very 
broad definition is specifically intended to include non-electronic da-
tabases126 and "the materials necessary for the operation or consult-
ation of certain databases such as thesaurus or indexation systems. "127 
Thus, databases covered by the Database Directive can be as diverse as 
a CD-ROM-based multimedia package, a World Wide Web site, an 
electronic or paper library card catalogue, or even the library itself.128 
121 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 16(1). 
122 See, e.g., Jens L. Gaster, The New EU Directive Concerning the Legal Protection of Databases, 20 
FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1129, 1129-31 & nn.1-1O (1997) (discussing history of the drafting of the 
Database Directive); Mark Powell, The European Union's Database Directive: An International 
Antidote to the Side Effects of Feist?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.]. 1215, 1215 (1997); w. R. Cornish, 
1996 European Community Directive on Database Protection, 21 COLUM.-VLA].L. & ARTS 1, 1 
(1996). 
123 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at recitals 11 and 12; Reichman & Samuelson, supra 
note 2, at 73-74; Trevor Black, Intellectual Property and the Information Industry-Software Devel-
opers' & Database Providers' Rights, EUR. CURRENT L., May 1997, at xii, xiii; Pamela Samuelson, 
The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA.]. INT'L L. 369, 420 (1997); Charles Von Simson, Note, 
Feist or Famine - American Database Copyright as an Economic Model for the European Union, 20 
BROOK.]. INT'L L. 729, 730 n.6, 735 (1995). 
124 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 1 (2). 
125 See id. at recital 21. 
126 See id. at recital 14 and art. 1 (1). 
127 See id. at recital 20. 
128 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at recital 22; Robert Carolina, The European Database 
Directive: An Introduction for Practitioners, 8 No.9]. PROPRIETARY RTS. 17, 18 (1996). 
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Article 2 of the Database Directive provides that the Directive does 
not preempt other Community statements on copyright, including the 
1992 Software Directive. 129 Further, Article 1 (3) excludes any computer 
programs used in the manufacture or operation of databases from 
protection under the Database Directive. lso This last point, however, 
appears at odds with the statement in Recital 20 that protections may 
extend to "the materials necessary for the operation or consultation of 
certain databases. "131 The issue of whether the regime of the Database 
Directive or Software Directive will apply to the mechanisms involved 
in manipulating the contents of a database has yet to be resolved. 132 
a. Protections 
The Database Directive extends copyright protection only to data-
bases that by reason of selection or arrangement of the database's 
contents constitute "the author's own intellectual creation,"133 i.e., that 
which evidence some amount of "originality" or "creativity" on the part 
of the author. Nevertheless, the Database Directive does not provide 
clear guidance on where the line should be drawn. 134 The Database 
Directive does make clear that Member States shall provide a new sui 
generis right to the maker of a database when the maker can show a 
"substantial investment" in obtaining, verifying or presenting the data-
base's contents. 13" Further, this new sui generis right grants a bundle of 
exclusive rights which may be transferred, assigned or granted under 
contractual license l36 although the sui generis right may not prejudice 
other rights in the contents of the database.137 The sui generis right 
protects the qualifYing database from the moment it is completed, 
and expires 15 years from the first of January following the date of 
completion. 13s Perhaps more importantly, a new 15 year term may be 
obtained if the database maker makes any "substantial change" or 
accumulates a series of successive changes which constitute a "subs tan-
129 See Directive 91/250/EC of the Council of May 14, 1991 on the legal protection of computer 
programs, 1991 OJ. (L 122) 42 [hereinafter Software Directive]. 
130 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 1 (3). 
131 See id. at recital 20. 
132 See Carolina, supra note 128, at 18. 
133 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at recital 15 and art. 3 (l). 
134 See Carolina, supra note 128, at 18. 
l35 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at recital 39 and art. 7(1). 
136 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 7(3); Powell, supra note 122, at 1225. 
137 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 7(4). 
138 See id. at art. 10(1). 
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tial new investment" in the database.139 Moreover, there is no apparent 
limit to the number of 15 year terms of protection a database may 
obtain.140 
The sui generis right enables the maker of a database "to prevent 
extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a substantial part" 
of the database contents141 and to prevent repeated and systematic 
extraction or re-utilization which unreasonably prejudices the maker's 
"legitimate interests."142 Extraction is defined as a transfer of the data-
base contents to another medium by any means or in any form includ-
ing temporary transfers such as on-screen display. 143 Re-utilization is de-
fined as making the database contents available to the public whether 
by distribution of copies or some form of transmission. 144 From this 
broad grant of protection to un copyrightable databases,145 several ex-
ceptions are carved. 146 
b. Exceptions and Limits to the Sui Generis Right 
An exception from the definitions of extraction and re-utilization is 
specifically carved out for "public lending" which is expressly defined 
as not an act of extraction or re-utilization. 147 Further, a maker of a 
database may not prevent in any manner a "lawful user" of the database 
from extracting and/ or re-utilizing insubstantial parts of the contents 
of the database. 148 The lawful user is authorized to use149 the database 
for any purpose which does not conflict with normal exploitation of 
the database or unreasonably prejudices the legitimate interest of the 
maker. 150 
139 See id. at art. 10(3). 
140 See Reichman, supra note 1, at 2495 & n.352. 
141 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 7(1). 
142 See id. at alt. 7(5). 
143 See id. at art. 7 (2) (a) and recital 44. 
144 See id. at art. 7(2)(b). 
145 See id. 
146 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at arts. 7(2), 8 and 9. 
147 See id. at art. 7 (2). Article 7 (2) reads in pertinent part: "Public lending is not an act of 
extraction or re-utilization." [d. However, nowhere in the Database Directive is the term "public 
lending" defined nor distinguished from the phrase "making available to the public" found in 
the definition of "re-utilization." 
148 See id. at art. 8(1) and recital 49. 
149 See id. art. 8(1). 
150 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 8(2). 
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In addition to these mandatory exceptions, Member States have the 
option to limit the sui generis right in certain ways.151 They may allow 
the extraction or re-utilization of a substantial part of the contents of 
a database without authorization by its maker, provided such extrac-
tions or re-utilizations are for non-commercial purposes,I!)2 when: (i) 
extraction is from a non-electronic database for private purposes (i.e., 
you can take notes) ,153 (ii) extraction is reasonable and for the purpose 
of illustration for teaching or scientific research as long as the source 
is indicated,154 or (iii) extraction and/or re-utilization is for the pur-
pose of public security or an administrative or judicial procedure.l!>s In 
addition to limits on the exercise of the sui generis right, there are also 
limits on who may benefit therefrom. 156 
The sui generis right does not apply to databases made by persons 
outside the EU unless they reside in a jurisdiction which provides 
comparable protection to EU persons. 157 The decision whether a non-
EU jurisdiction provides comparable legal protection is vested in the 
European Council of Ministers acting upon a proposal from the Euro-
pean Commission. 158 Thus, these reciprocity provisions of the Database 
Directive provide the EU with a bargaining chip in negotiations with 
its trading partners. 159 
2. Norms Behind the Database Directive 
The EU Database Directive protects and encourages production of 
noncreative databases by an underlying norm that, de jacto, recognizes 
an ownership interest in the contents of the database itself.160 The sui 
generis right permits control of extraction or re-use of a databases' con-
151 See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text. 
152 See id. at recital 50 
153 See id. at art. 9(a). 
154 See Database Directive. supra note 32, at art. 9(b). 
155 See id. at art. 9(c). 
156 See id. at art. 11 (3) and recital 56. 
1r,7 See id. at recital 56. 
1,,8 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 11 (3). 
159 See Powell, supra note 122, at 1248. 
160 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 89, 94; Von Simson, supra note 123, at 755-56; 
see also Cindy Alberts Carson, Laser Bones: Copytight Issues Raised by the Use of Information 
Technology in Archaeology, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 295, 311 (1997) (describing how a de facto 
monopoly over purely factual materials may be obtained by embedding them in protectable 
expression); Hunsucker, supra note 19, at 763 (recognizing that a sui generis regime may permit 
a de facto ownership in sole source data). But see Database Directive, supra note 32, at recital 46, 
which specifically disclaims the creation of any right in the database contents. 
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tents and creates, a priori, a bundle of transferable property rights. 161 
In contrast, an unfair competition approach sanctions actions a poste-
. . 162 non. 
There are primarily two reasons why the EV adopted a norm based 
on a sui generis property interest instead of one based on principles of 
unfair competition: (1) the logistical difficulty of harmonization, and 
(2) a desire to protect databases from information samaritans as well 
as free riders.163 The former argument is based on the premise that an 
unfair competition approach would require harmonization of a regime 
of law which varies between Member States, both in form and degree 
of development. 164 Accepting this premise, the Commission logically 
chose not to undertake a logistically difficult harmonization of unfair 
competition law when its goal was simply to boost one narrow eco-
nomic sector of the EV-database production.165 Similarly, this narrow 
sector possessed specific problems considered not addressed by unfair 
competition law: the prevention of both commercial and non-commer-
cial approbations of database contents. Hi6 Clearly, based on the assump-
tion that unfair competition principles are limited to regulation of 
behavior between competitors, a property interest provides a more 
general legal regime whereby to regulate the acts of all unauthorized 
users of the property.167 Thus, a norm based on a sui generis property 
interest catches not just the free rider but the information samaritan 
as wel1. 168 
3. Summary 
The sui generis right provided by the Database Directive creates an 
intellectual property right which goes much further than the copyright 
law of most nations. 169 The sui generis righ t prohibits substan tial extrac-
161 See Gaster, supra note 122, at 1143. 
162 See id. 
163 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 81; Powell, supra note 122, at 1224-25. Some 
commentators have observed that the sui generis right created serves the intention to "favor 
European database publishers at the expense of their customers and non-EU competitors." Von 
Simson, supra note 123, at 735. 
164 See Powell, supra note 122, at 1224-25; see also Database Directive, supra note 32, at recital 
6. 
165 See Powell, supra note 122, at 1224-25. 
166 See id. at 1224-25. 
167 See id. at 1225. 
168 See id. 
169 See WlPO Database Memorandum, supra note 2, at 7-8; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 
2, at 86; Cornish, supra note 122, at 13; Carolina, supra note 128, at 23. 
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tion or re-use of a database's contents by all unauthorized users. 170 
Further, this right is not subject to compulsory licensing arrangements 
even in cases where the database compiler is the sole source of the 
database contents. 171 In effect, the EU Database Directive has created 
an "easy to protect! easy to infringe" system for protection of noncrea-
tive databases. 172 
Nevertheless, the Directive does provide Member States the option 
to enact exceptions to this righ t. l73 These optional exceptions are 
extremely important because, absent one of these exceptions, the sui 
generis right creates a functional monopoly on the contents of a sole 
source database. 174 
D. WIPO, The Berne Convention and TRIPS 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a special-
ized agency of the United Nations which administers the Berne Con-
vention. 175 The goal of the Berne Convention is to protect and promote 
the international rights of authors. 176 The Berne Convention protects 
"literary, scientific and artistic" works but "news of the day [or] ... 
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press infor-
mation" are expressly excluded from protection. 177 Authors of qualify-
ing works under the Berne Convention are granted the exclusive rights 
of translation, reproduction, public performance, broadcasting, adap-
tation, and arrangement of their work for a term of the author's life 
170 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 7 (1). 
171 See Cornish, supra note 122, at 11. A compulsory license provision was part of previous drafts. 
See Council Directive Amended Proposal, art. 11, 1993 OJ. (C 308) 1, 13-14. However, database 
producers lobbied hard to secure its removal. See Cornish, supra note 122, at 11; Reichman & 
Samuelson, supra note 2, at 75, 94. 
172 "Easy to protect" because the Database Directive broadly defines a database and provides a 
sui generis intellectual property right \,~th only a showing of a qualitative or quantitative substantial 
investment. See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 7(1); supra notes 125-28, 135, 136 and 
accompanying text. "Easy to infringe" because of the broad protection afforded by the sui generis 
right. See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text. 
173 See Database Directive, supra note 32, at art. 9. 
174 See Von Simson, supra note 123, at 755-56; see also Carson, supra note 160, at 295, 311 
(describing how a de facto monopoly over purely factual materials may be obtained by embedding 
them in protectable expression). But see Database Directive, supra note 32, at recital 46 which 
specifically disclaims the creation of any right in the database contents. 
175 See Berne Convention, supra note 2; D'AMATO & LONG, supra note I, at 222. 
176 See Berne Convention, supra note 2, at preamble and art. 1; D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 
1, at 267. 
177 See Berne Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2(1), 2(8); D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 1, at 
264-65. 
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plus 50 years.178 Additionally, the Berne Convention provides protec-
tion to collections, such as encyclopedias or anthologies, that by reason 
of the selection and arrangement of their contents constitute intellec-
tual creations. 179 Consequently, the Berne Convention does not provide 
protection for noncreative databases. 18o 
However, by its very terms, the Berne Convention prohibits the EU 
from denying to other signatory states, such as the U.S. and Japan, the 
protections afforded by the Database Directive's sui generis right to 
works within the EU regardless of whether such signatory state pro-
vides comparable protection. 181 To achieve its ends, the Berne Conven-
tion requires minimum standards of protection for authors and "na-
tional treatment"182 of authors of signatory states. IS:l Consequently, any 
application of material reciprocity that denies an author "national 
treatment" is an act in violation of the Berne Convention, even if the 
rights granted the author far exceed the minimums imposed by the 
convention.184 However, the Berne Convention does not provide for 
17S See D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 1, at 265. 
179See Berne Convention, supra note 2, at art. 2(5), which reads: "Collections of literary or 
artistic works such as encyclopedias and anthologies which, by reason of the selection and 
arrangement of their contents, constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such, without 
prejudice to the copyright in each of the works forming part of such collections." 
ISO In December 1996, however, WlPO hosted a diplomatic conference at Geneva to consider 
proposals to supplement and update the Berne Convention. See Basic Proposal for the Substantive 
Provision of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Databases to be Considered by the 
Diplomatic Conference, WlPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter lWPO Proposal on 
Databases]; Recommendation Concerning Databases, WlPO Doc. CRNR/DC/lOO (Dec. 23, 
1996); Samuelson, supra note 123, at 375 & n.36, 418-28; Jack E. Brown, Prvposed International 
Protection of Electronic Databases, 14 No.1 COMPUTER LAW. 17, 19 (1991). One proposal called 
for providing noncreative databases with sui generis protection along the lines of those contained 
in the EU Database Directive. See lWPO Proposal on Databases, supra; Recommendation Concern-
ing Databases, WlPO Doc. CRNR/DC/lOO (Dec. 23, 1996); Samuelson, supra at 375 & n.36; 
Brown, supra at 19. Although the proposed protection was not adopted, the conference did adopt 
a resolution calling for additional work to be done concerning a possible treaty on database 
protection. See WIPO Proposal on Databases, supra; Recommendation Concerning Databases, 
WlPO Doc. CRNR/DC/lOO (Dec. 23, 1996); Samuelson, supra at 375 & n.36; Brovm, supra at 
19. Recently, in September 1997, at the WlPO Information Meeting on Intellectual Property in 
Databases, the EU sui generis approach was discussed and a draft of a report of the meeting is 
being prepared. As of this writing Oanuary 22, 1999), however, no further meetings are on record 
as scheduled. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, hI/ormation Meeting on Intel-
lectual Property in Databases, 12 INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 349,349-50 (Dec. 1997). 
lSI See Berne Convention, supra note 2, at art. 5(1), (2). 
lS2 "National treatment" requires a country to provide no less favorable treatment to persons 
of foreign member states than it does to its own citizens. See Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: 
Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3J.L. & TECH. 1, 16--17 (1988). 
lS3 See Berne Convention, supra note 2, at art. 5. 
lS4 See id. at art. 5(1), (2). 
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enforcement measures, dispute resolution, or a mechanism to sanction 
parties who fail to adhere to their treaty obligations. lss 
Nevertheless, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS), administered by the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) , does provide enforcement mechanisms to sanction 
parties who fail to adhere to their treaty obligations under TRIPS.186 
Moreover, the TRIPS Agreement explicitly requires both "national 
treatment" and compliance with Articles 1 to 21, and the Appendix 
thereto, of the Berne Convention. ls7 Accordingly, the TRIPS Agree-
ment's requirement of "national treatment" puts in question the valid-
ity of the Database Directive's reciprocity clause.18s 
III. THE UNITED STATES MODEL 
A. Existing Law 
l. Copyright 
In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone,189 the U.S. Supreme Court 
made clear in an unanimous decision that under both the 1976 Copy-
right Actl90 and the U.S. Constitution,191 a compilation qualifies for 
copyright only if it displays originality and a modicum of creativity in 
the selection or arrangement of its contents. 192 Although "the requisite 
level of creativity is extremely IOW"193 and noveltyl94 is not required for 
originality,l95 it remains that "[t]he sine qua non of copyright is origi-
nality."l96 The Court reasoned that the primary objective of copyright 
is not to reward the labors of authors but "[t]o promote the Progress 
185 See D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 1, at 267. 
186 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at Part VII art. 68. 
187 See id. at art. 3 and Part II, § 1, art. 9; D'AMATO & LONG, supra note 1, at 276. 
188 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at Part I, art. 3 and Part II, § 1, art. 9. 
189 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340, III S. Ct. 1282 (1991). 
190 See 17 U.S.c. § I02(a)(I994). 
191 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
192 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 358, 362. 
193 See id. at 345. 
194 Originality means only that the work was created independently; thus a work may be original 
even though it is identical to another so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not tlle result of 
copying. See id. at 345-46. Whereas novelty would require that a work not be identical to or even 
closely resemble another work. See id. 
195 See id. at 358. 
196 See id. at 345. 
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of Science and useful ArtS."197 Accordingly, the expenditure of labor 
and capital, i.e., "sweat of the brow," to create a compilation, no matter 
how extensive, in and of itself does not make a compilation copyrigh-
table. 198 Thus, in the United States noncreative databases are not pro-
tected by copyright from approbation of their contents. 
In practice, determining whether and what aspects of a database 
display "originality and a modicum of creativity" may prove very dif-
ficult since new technologies which permit more "intelligent" com-
puter-based analysis of text blur the line between information and 
expression.199 An exemplary and relevant case, which appears to sur-
vive Feist, is West Publishing v. Mead Data Central wherein the Eighth 
Circuit found copyrightable expression in the page numbers and page 
breaks of West's reports.200 The case turned on the issue of whether 
. West's pagination was merely a sequence of Arabic numbers which are 
the natural result of its arrangement of cases, and hence uncopyrigh-
. table information, or whether West's pagination was integral to West's 
arrangement of the cases, and hence copyrightable expression.201 The 
Eighth Circuit found the latter to be the case on the grounds that 
internal page citations are an important part of West's case arrange-
ments.202 Hence, the court reasoned that because pagination was inte-
gral to the copyrightable aspects of the compilation it was protected 
by copyright.203 Nevertheless, the fact that a substantial investment in 
compilation of a database can turn on such fine characterizations of 
the facts generates uncertainty and justifiable concern amongst data-
base compilers as to the security of their investments.204 
197 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349. 
198 See id. at 364. 
199 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 65; John H. Burton, Adapting the Intellectual 
Property System to New Technologies, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RiGHTS 
IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 1, at 269. 
200 See West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, at 1226-27 (8th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. lO70 (1987). 
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. at 1227. But cf id. at 1237 (J. Oliver, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stating 
that there is no indication in the record of who Cl"eates West's page numbers or of how they are 
created). 
204 See Hearings, supra note 11, (written statement of the Coalition Against Database Piracy) 
(readily available at <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41117.httn>); Susan H. Nycum, Database 
Protection, 453 PU/PAT 575, 578 (1996); compare Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley 
Info. Publ'g, Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 957, 958 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding selection of geographic 
boundaries and business classifications in a classified business directory (yellow pages) sufficient 
Cl"eativity to make directory copyrightable), vacated and reh g en banc granted, 977 F.2d 1435, 1435 
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Sensibly, the Supreme Court in Feist heeded the legitimate concerns 
of database compilers over market-destructive approbations of their 
investment and the need to provide incentives for investment in data-
base development.205 The Court expressly stated, in dicta, that protec-
tion for the investment of labor and capital in non creative databases 
"may in certain circumstances be available under a theory of unfair 
competition. "206 
2. Unfair Competition Law & The Doctrine of Misappropriation 
The doctrine of misappropriation in United States jurisprudence 
arises out of International News Service v. Associated Press (INS v. AP). 207 
During the first world war, the International News Service (INS) and 
Associated Press (AP) were engaged in keen competition over the 
gathering and publication of news concerning the war. 208 When foreign 
governments barred INS from securing news from their respective 
countries, INS began a campaign to "pirate" AP's news.209 As part of its 
campaign, INS copied AP news, either exactly or rewriting it, from 
bulletin boards and early editions of AP newspapers.210 The Supreme 
Court characterized AP's right as a "quasi property" right in the news 
it had gathered and held that AP could prohibit competitors from 
using it "until its commercial value as news ... has passed away."211 In 
the Court's view, INS was "endeavoring to reap where it ha[d] not 
sown" in a process that amounted to "an unauthorized interference 
with ... [AP's] legitimate business precisely at the point where the 
profit is to be reaped."212 The court reasoned that unless such practices 
(11th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 999 F.2d 1436, 1443, 1445 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding copyright does not 
extend to telephone directory since selections obvions because dictated by functional considera-
tions and common industry practice); cf. Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enter., 
Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (1991) (finding copyright extends to classified business telephone direc-
tory, i.e., white and yellow pages, for New York City's Chinese-American community on grounds 
that there is sufficient creativity in deciding which business categories to include). 
205 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 354, 360, 364. 
206 See id. at 354. 
207 See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, passim, 39 S. Ct. 68 (1918). 
208 See id. at 230. 
209 See id. at 231, 263 (INS pirated AP news in three ways: first, INS bribed AP employees to 
disclose AP news prior to publication by AP's clients; second, INS induced AP members to violate 
its by-laws and provide AP news to INS prior to publication; and, third, INS copied AP news, 
either exactly or rewriting it, from bulletin boards and early editions of AP newspapers). 
210 See id. at 23l. 
211 See id. at 236,245 (defining quasi property right as right not against the world but as between 
two parties with respect to contested "property"). 
212 See INS v. AP, 248 U.S. at 239-40. 
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were prohibited, no news service could stay in business.2I3 Nevertheless, 
although the norm applied by the court is clear-to prevent free rides 
on the labor of others-the constellation of facts under which this 
norm should be applied, and the criteria which make subsumption of 
a particular fact under the norm possible, are not.2l4 
The doctrine of misappropriation is difficult to understand and 
apply primarily because it lacks a firm analytical underpinning.215 In 
part, this is due to the ad hoc nature of its creation in INS v. AP,216 as 
such it has been suggested that the misappropriation holding of INS 
v. AP should be confined to its facts. 217 Nevertheless, it is useful to 
sketch the outline of a claim of misappropriation in order to analyze 
and understand the development of the doctrine. The possible ele-
men ts of misappropriation under a broad reading of INS v. AP are (1) 
an unauthorized and (2) knowing appropriation of (3) an intangible 
product of a competitor (or other's) labor from (4) a legitimate busi-
ness so as to (5) diminish the profit of said competitor (or other) 
and/or (6) appropriate the profit for oneself.218 The sources of the 
characterization of misappropriation as a "haphazard protection whim-
sically afforded" are readily apparent from a cursory reading of these 
elements.219 First, the object of protection (the "intangible product") 
213 See id. at 240-41. 
214 See Raskind, supra note 19, at 881; see generally JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL 
REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 126-27, 168-71,208-10,219 (1993) (discussing 
decision making in application of law and legal justification in hard cases). 
215 See Raskind, supra note 19, at 881. 
216 See id. 
217 See National Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 852 & n.7; R.C.A. Mfg. Co. v. Whitman, 114 F.2d 
86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940) (1. Learned Hand urging INS v. AP be held to its facts because it lacks 
analytical underpinnings, i.e., "any clue to its preference"); Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 
F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (1. Learned Hand urging INS v. AP be held to its facts because it 
lacks analytical underpinnings, i.e., "[t]he difficulties of understanding it are insuperable"), cert. 
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. 
c (1995) ("The facts of the INS decision are unusual and may serve, in part, to limit its 
rationale .... Many subsequent decisions have expressly limited the INS case to its facts.") 
218 See INS v. AP, 248 U.S. at 240. The Supreme Court characterized INS's conduct as 
"amount [ing] to an unauthorized interference with the normal operation of complainant's 
legitimate business precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a 
material portion of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have not; with special 
advantage to defendant in the competition because of the fact that it is not burdened with any 
part of the expense of gathering the news." See id.; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 38 (1995) which reads: "One who causes harm to the commercial relations of 
another by appropIiating the other's intangible trade values is subject to liability to the other for 
such harm .... "; cf. also Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East at 575, 577-78 (prohibiting malicious 
interference with trade precisely at point where ducks, i.e., "profits," are to be reaped). 
219 See Hunsucker, supra note 19, at 703; Reichman, supra note 1, at 2476; Raskind, supra note 
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is ill-defined; second, it is unclear who is eligible for protection (is it 
only competitors?); and, third, it appears there are no safeguards to 
balance public interest concerns.220 
Not surprisingly, the most recent definition of misappropriation, set 
forth by the Second Circuit in National Basketball Association v. Mo-
torola, Inc., interprets INS v. AP narrowly.221 The Second Circuit rea-
soned that INS v. AP should be held to its facts owing to a lack of an 
analytic underpinning for the doctrine of misappropriation.222 Conse-
quently, under NBA v. Motorola, the central elements for a claim of 
misappropriation are (1) the compiler generates or collects informa-
tion at some cost, (2) the value of which is highly time-sensitive and 
(3) the defendant's use thereof constitutes a free-ride on the com-
piler's investment and (4) competes directly with the compilers prod-
uct or sen-ice, and (5) is conduct of a kind that if repeated by others 
would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that 
its existence or quality would be substantially threatened.223 Arguably, 
the Second Circuit in NBA v. Motorola interpretted the remedy pro-
vided in INS v. AP-an ir~junction on INS's use of the news "until its 
commercial value as news to the complainant ... has passed away"-as 
an element for a claim of misappropriation and hence, read INS v. AP 
very narrowly.224 Nonetheless, such a reading does clarify the object of 
protection and indirectly provides a safeguard to the public interest. 225 
However, the shortcomings of the doctrine of misappropriation may 
have more to do with the yeoman's duty22() which it has been made to 
19, at 881 & n.36; see also Carpenter v. U.S., 484 u.s. 19, 26-27 (1987) (suggesting monetary loss 
is not n6cessary element of claim of misappropriation). 
220 See Reichman, supra note I, at 2476; cf Karjala, supra note 21, at 2604--05 (advocating that 
a better focus for doctrine of misappropriation is prevention of market failure instead of objects 
of protection). See also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
221 See NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 852. 
222 See id. at 851,852 & n.7, 853. 
223 See id. at 845, 852; cf. INS v. AP, 248 U.S. at 245. 
224 See INS v. AP, 248 U.S. at 245. 
225 The limitation to time-sensitive information, i.e. "hot-news," provides a determinable bound-
ary to the object of protection and provides an inherently short limit on the length of time 
information may be held out of the public domain. See NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 845, 852 
n.7. 
226 See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 10 I N.Y.S.2d 483, 488, 
492 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (describing that misappropriation law developed to deal with "commer-
cial immorality"); see also National Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 845, 853 ("INS is not about 
ethics"); Gerhard Schricker, International Aspects of the Law of Unfair Competition, in INTERNA-
TIONAL HARMONIZATION OF COMPETITION LAWS 129, 130-32 (C.:}. Cheng et al. eds., 1995) 
(discussing origin and development of unfair competition law). 
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perform and the case-by-case way it has evolved.227 Legislation limited 
to a specific object of protection and economic context may avoid 
these shortcomings.228 
B. The 105th Congress' Proposal: S. 2291 "The Collections of 
Information A ntipiracy Act" 
Congressional Bill S. 2291 of the 105th Congress, the "Collections 
of Information Antipiracy Act," under a doctrine of misappropriation, 
offers an answer to the legitimate concerns of database compilers over 
market-destructive approbations of their investment and the need to 
provide incentives for investment in database development.229 This bill 
differs dramatically from H.R. 3531, the "Database Investment and 
Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act," introduced in the 104th Con-
gress. 230 The Database Investment Act, H.R. 3531, proposed to enact a 
sui generis right for noncreative databases strikingly similar to that 
provided under the ED Database Directive.231 H.R. 3531 languished in 
the Senate; S. 2291, has risen. 232 
The limited, and evolving,233 legislative history behind Congressional 
bill S. 2291 indicates that its primary purpose is to provide protection 
227 Courts have never articulated a coherent set of principles for application of the doctrine of 
misappropriation, rather, it has only been occassionalty invoked and then on an ad hoc basis. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 Clnt. b (1995); Reichman, supra note 1, at 
2476. 
228 Cf KaIjala, supra note 21, at 928 (concluding a more nearly perfect scheme for protection 
of works such as non creative databases might lie in an anti-misappropriation statute tailored to 
specific characteristics of work); Raskind, supra note 19, at 906 (concluding that examination of 
misappropriation issues in context of competitive markets can give doctrine analytic content). 
229 See Collections ofInfonnation Antipiracy Act, S. 2291, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1998); 143 
Congo Rec. E2000-02 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coble). The United States is not 
unique in favoring an approach under unfair competition laws as opposed to sui generis rights. 
For example, Germany and Spain prefer an unfair competition approach. See Powell, supra note 
122, at 1224; Cristina Garrigues, Databases: A Sub/eet-matter for Copyright or for a Neighboring Rights 
Regime?, 1 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 3, 5 n.18 (1997). And the Swiss use unfair competition 
principles extensively. See Kamen Troller & Isabelle Hering, Switzerland, in UNFAIR TRADING 
PRACTICES 279, 283, 308 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1996); Cornish, supra note 122, at 3 & n.8; see 
also WIPO Database Memorandum, supra note 2. 
230 Compare H.R. 3531, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) with S. 2291, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998). 
231 Compare, e.g., H.R. 3531 at § 4 with Database Directive, supra note 32, art. 7. 
232 See The Library of Congress Website (last visited March 17, 1999) <thomas.loc.gov>; BNA 
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Aug. 25,1997. 
233 S. 2291 originated from a bill sponsored by Rep. Coble, Collections of Information Antipi-
racy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1997). Hearings on H.R. 2652 were held on 
October 23, 1997. H.R. 2652 garnered five cosponsors before passing the House (Amended) by 
voice vote on May 19,1998. H.R. 2652 was introduced to the Senate by Sen. Grams on July 10, 
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to noncreative databases234 from unscrupulous competitors who would 
pirate the investment of others.235 The legislative history particularly 
recognizes that such legislation is needed in response to the decision 
in Feist. 236 Further, although not a primary motivation for S. 2291, the 
history indicates Congress' interest in whether this bill meets the re-
quirements of comparable protection found in the EU database direc-
tive.237 
S. 2291, by definition, covers collections of facts, data, works of 
authorship, and any other intangible material capable of being col-
lected and organized in a systematic way.23R It proposes protection 
under a doctrine of misappropriation that extends to noncreative 
databases: 
Any person who extracts, or uses in commerce, all or a sub-
stantial part, measured either quantitatively or qualitatively, 
of a collection of information gathered, organized, or main-
tained by another person through the investment of substan-
tial monetary or other resources, so as to cause harm to the 
actual or potential market of that other person, or a successor 
in interest of that other person, for a product or service that 
incorporates that collection of information and is offered or 
intended to be offered for sale or otherwise in commerce by 
that other person, or a successor in interest of that person, 
shall be liable to that person or successor in interest for the 
remedies set forth in section 1206.23~ 
This protection is limited to collections of information that entail a 
substantial investment on the part of the compiler. 240 The object of 
protection is further narrowed by exclusions contained in § 1204 of 
the bill.241 Specifically, § 1204(a) (1) excludes from protection collec-
tions of information gathered by or within the scope of employment 
1998 as S. 2291. The latest action on S. 2291 took place October 3, 1998-a referral to the 
Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government. See The Library of Congress 
Website (last visited March 17, 1999) <thomas.loc.gov>. 
234 See S. 2291, supra note 11. 
235 See S. 2291 at § 2; 143 Congo Rec. E2000-02 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1997) (statement of Rep. 
Coble). 
236 See id. 
237 See Hearings, supra note 11, at 125-26 (question of Rep. Delahunt). 
23R See S. 2291, supra note 11, at § 1201. 
239 See id. at § 1202 (emphasis added). 
240 See id. at § 1202. 
241 See id. at § 1204. 
454 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XXII, No.2 
of a governmental entity whether Federal, State or local; § 1204(a) (2) 
excludes certain information reported under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 or Commodity Exchange Act; and § 1204(b) specifically 
excludes computer programs from protection under S. 2291.242 More-
over, considerations of public interest are incorporated in § 1203 
which describes acts permitted under the bilJ.243 Specifically, § 1203(a) 
permits de minimus extractions and uses; § 1203(b) permits inde-
pendent gathering of information by other means; § 1203(c) allows 
extraction and use to verify independently gathered information; 
§ 1203(d) permits extractions and uses for nonprofit educational, 
scientific, or research purposes; § 1203(e) permits extraction and utili-
zation for the sole purpose of news reporting; and § 1203(f) permits 
the sale, or other disposal, of a lawful copy.244 
Congressional Bill S. 2291 provides a practical approach to the 
protection of noncreative databases under a doctrine of misappropria-
tion because it is limited to a specific object of protection and addresses 
the economic context in which noncreative databases exist. The bill 
specifically protects databases but only those in which a substantial 
investment has been made and which are not produced by or through 
a governmental entity.245 Further, although misappropriation is gener-
ally held to apply only to commercial approbations,246 the bill also 
protects noncreative databases from non-commercially motivated mis-
appropriations247 recognizing that a lone individual, employing digital 
technologies, can easily, cheaply and widely disseminate a database 
with significant market-destructive consequences.248 Moreover, the bill 
provides provisions to safeguard public interest concerns in the pro-
242 See S. 2291, supra note 11, at § 1204. 
243 See id. at § 1203. 
244 See id. at § 1203(a) which reads in part: "Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the eXU'action 
or use of an individual item of information, or other insubstantial part of a collection of 
information, in itself'; id. at § 1203(d) reads: "Nothing in this chapter shall restrict any person 
from extracting or using information for nonprofit educational, scientific, or research purposes 
in a manner that does not harm the actual or potential market for the product or service referred 
to in section 1202." 
245 See S. 2291, supra note 11, at §§ 1202 and 1204(a). 
246See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240 (1918); National 
Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 (1995). 
247 See S. 2291, supra note 11, at § 1202 (protecting qualifYing databases from market destructive 
approbations without regard to motivation or use of misappropriator); § 1207 (a)( I)(B) (provid-
ing criminal penalty for misappropriations not motivated by desire for commercial advantage or 
financial gain). . 
248 See, e.g., U.S. v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 540 & n.8, 542-43 (D. Mass. 1994). 
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gress of science and freedom of expression.249 Thus, S. 2291 represents 
a balanced, practical approach to addressing the legitimate concerns 
of database compilers. 
IV. TOWARDS HARMONIZATION 
A. Harmonization 
Harmonization should consist of serious inquiry into which norma-
tive principle is best able to achieve a common goal,250 The EU Data-
base Directive has profoundly increased the protection afforded Com-
munity member compilers of noncreative databases.251 The 
consequences of the EU's decision to grant this sui generis property 
right to non creative databases are economic and political. 252 Although 
touted as a balanced approach, protection of the public interest is 
largely left to Member State implementation of optional exclusions 
which mayor may not prevent acquisition by database compilers of a 
de facto ownership interest in the contents of the database itself.253 By 
removing virtually all mandatory accommodations to the public inter-
est, the EU approach favors database compilers at the expense of their 
customers.254 Moreover, the Directive's reciprocity provision sets the 
stage for promotion of Member State database compilers at the ex-
pense of their non-EU competitors.255 Certainly, the approach taken by 
the EU Database Directive is well appointed to stimulate European 
investment in databases and thereby increase the European share of a 
market which is a "cornerstone" to the economic development plans 
of the EU.25G On the other hand, to posit reciprocity on other countries 
amending their laws-primarily to make it easier for EU database 
producers to acquire market share-makes no sense as a basis for 
harmonization.257 However, a proposal for the protection of noncrea-
249 See S. 2291, supra note 11, at § 1203(d)- (e). 
250 See D'AMATO & LONG, supra note I, at 37, 71, 413; see also Armstrong, supra note 24, at 
157-58 (discussing difficulty in harmonization of U.S. and Japanese patent laws); see generally 
Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 
UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 199 (1994). 
251 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
252 See Von Simson, supra note 123, at 767-68; supm discussion Parts I. and n.D. 
253 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
254 See Von Simson, supra note 123, at 735. 
255 See id. 
256 See Database Directive, supra note 32, recitals 11 and 12; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 
2, at 73-74; Black, supra note 123, at xii-xiii; Von Simson, supra note 123, at 735. 
257 See sources cited supra note 250. 
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tive databases under a sui generis right regime has been submitted by 
the EU to the WIPO and, although not accepted, such a regime is still 
under consideration.258 Nevertheless, the current EU approach is not 
harmonization but rather use of a legal system as a bargaining chip to 
acquire favorable trade relationships.259 Accordingly, if the EU, Japan 
and the U.S. seek harmonization, or even "materially equivalent" pro-
tection for noncreative databases, any approach must find an accept-
able basis in each nation's philosophy.260 
The functional effect of the EU sui generis right is incongruous with 
that of both the Japanese and U.S. copyright law. 26! The differences 
between U.S. and Japanese copyright law may be more expressive than 
substantive in the context of databases.262 Consider the set of facts 
which lead to a remedy against an alleged infringement of a database 
in Japan and in the U.S.263 In Japan, the courts require more than 
originality and a modicum of creativity in the selection or arrangement 
of its contents; they also require a modicum of novelty or "new 
thought. "264 This approach produces a "hard to copyright" system. 265 
On the other hand, Japanese copyright, once obtained, is "easy to 
infringe."266 Compare this to the U.S. system.267 The U.S. courts set a 
low threshold of originality and a modicum of creativity for copyrigh-
tability.268 This produces an "easy to copyright" system.21i9 However, this 
is counter-balanced by the "thin" protection the U.S. extends to factual 
compilations, making databases "hard to infringe."27o The functional 
effect is the same under both systems: only databases of "considerable" 
creativity obtain a meaningful remedy from infringement.27! Accord-
258 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
259 See Powell, supra note 122, at 1248. 
260 See D'AMATO & LONG, supra note I, at 413; see also Armstrong, supra note 24, at 157-58 
(discussing difficulty in harmonization of U.S. and Japanese patent laws). 
261 See supra Parts II.A. and III. 
262 Compare supra Parts II.A.3. with supra Part I1I.A.1. 
263 [d. 
264 See Dennis S. Kaljala & Keiji Sugiyama, Fundamental Concepts in japanese and American 
Copyright Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN, supra note 56, at 
724. 
265 See id. 
266 See supra Part III.A.1. 
267 See id. 
268 See id. 
269 [d. 
270See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349, 350-51 (1991); Baker 
v. Seldon, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). 
271 See supra notes 261-70 and accompanying text. 
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ingly, the "easy to protect/easy to infringe" system created by the EU 
for databases is functionally incongruous with the Japanese "hard to 
protect/easy to infringe" system and the United States' "easy to pro-
tect/hard to infringe" system.m 
The normative underpinning of the EU sui generis right is also 
incongruous with that of both the Japanese and U.S. copyright laws. 273 
The primary normative underpinning for U.S. copyright law is clear: 
copyright does not reward the labors of authors but "promote[s] the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts. "274 A similar normative underpin-
ning in Japanese copyright law can be inferred from the Japanese 
requirement of novelty or "new thought. "275 The Japanese courts' em-
phasis on "new thought" is, in actuality, an evaluation of an author's 
contribution and addition to the world of something it did not have 
before; and thus, by inference, the author's contribution to the ad-
vancement ofknowledge.276 Hence, the predominant norm underlying 
copyright in Japan and the U.S. is the advancement of the public 
interest. This norm conflicts with the EU Database Directive's de facto 
grant of a property interest in information.277 
The approach taken by the EU Database Directive to protect non-
creative databases does not provide an acceptable basis for harmoni-
zation of database protection among the EU, Japan and the U.S.278 
Neither the functional effect nor the normative basis of the Directive's 
sui generis property right is compatible with the principles of Japanese 
and U.S. copyright law.279 In fact, the possibly perpetual protection 
obtainable under the sui generis right and the profound underprotec-
tion of the public interest create a regime of rights that supersedes 
even that granted copyrightable works in most nations. 2Ro Not surpris-
ingly, the "world" under the auspices of WIPO is also unready to 
272 Compare supra notes 124-28,136,141-45,172 and accompanying text with notes 261-70 
and accompanying text. 
273 See supra Part II.C; if. supra Parts II.A.I, II.A.3 and I1IA.I. 
274 See supra Part III.A.I. 
275 See supra Part II.A.I. 
276 See id. 
277 See supra Part II.C; cf supra Parts II.A.I, IIA.3 and III.A.I. 
278 See D'AMATo & LONG, supra note I, at 37, 71, 413; Cornish, supra note 122, at 13; Carolina, 
supra note 128, at 23; see also Armstrong, supra note 24, at 157-58 (discussing difficulty in 
harmonization of U.S. and Japanese patent laws); see generally Geller, supra note 250. 
279 See supra notes 261-77 and accompanying text. 
280 See Database Directive, supra note 32, art. 10(3); Cornish, supra note 122, at 13; Carolina, 
supra note 128, at 23. 
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recognize a sui generis property right as the solution for database 
protection.281 
However, another and better solution exists, which finds support 
both in the copyright systems and cultural norms of Japan , the Nordic 
Nations and the U.S.: the doctrine of misappropriation.282 The norm 
underpinning this doctrine was expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court 
as reaping what another has sown,283 and the same norm, expressed 
differently, has been applied in several Japanese trademark cases.284 
Consequently, misappropriation as a norm of protection for noncrea-
tive databases is in greater harmony with Japanese and U.S. legal and 
cultural treatment of ownership and use of intangible interests which 
do not find protection under traditional notions of intellectual prop-
erty.285 An underlying concern of any form of intellectual property 
protection is whether the restriction on the flow of ideas threatens the 
advance of knowledge or public access to ideas, information and ex-
pressions.286 
A doctrine based on misappropriation is more compatible with tra-
ditional notions of copyright and better protects public interest con-
cerns.287 Misappropriation doctrine carves a set of impermissible uses 
out of a general right of the public to use an intangible interest, 
whereas a sui generis property right grants the owner exclusive control 
over use of the intangible interest and from this right carves out public 
interest exceptions.288 Nevertheless, a doctrine of misappropriation is 
not inherently limited to regulation of behavior between competitors 
or commercial approbations. 289 Misappropriation also protects incen-
tives to invest in the creation of an intangible asset from appropriations 
that destroy all incentive to create the asset. 290 
281 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
282 See supra Parts II.A.2, II.A.3, n.B and IILA.2; see also supra notes 25-28 and accompanying 
text. 
283 See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918). 
284 See supra Part I1.A.2. 
285 See supra Parts ILA and lILA. 
286 See Paepke, supra note 36, at 80; supra note 41 and accompanying text 
287 See, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 163-66; Gaster, supra note 122, at 1143; 
Karjala, supra note 21, at 926-28. But see, e.g., Hunsucker, supra note 19, passim. 
288 See sources cited supra note 287. 
289 See, e.g., Carpenter v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19,26-27 (1987) (suggesting that monetary loss is not 
a necessary element of a claim of misappropriation). 
290 See International News Service, 248 U.S. at 240-41 (1918); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 38 cmt. b (1995). 
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The problem with a harmonized doctrine of misappropriation is not 
its normative underpinnings, but rather, its analytic underpinnings. 291 
Although examples are few, consider that the Nordic Catalogue Rule 
has successfully reduced the pressure on copyright to protect noncrea-
tive databases. 292 The principle criticisms of the doctrine of misappro-
priation have been directed at its amorphous elements.293 Accordingly, 
a misappropriation approach can be given a workable analytic founda-
tion if a noncreative database protection law based thereon is particu-
larly tailored to the context of databases. 294 Such an approach would 
limit the object of protection to databases that require substantial 
investments of labor or capital to compile.295 Further, the context in 
which databases exist requires that protection extend to cover acts of 
both free-riders and information samaritans.296 Correspondingly, the 
importance of databases as the new building blocks of knowledge 
requires that such protection does not extend so as to prohibitively 
interfere with public interest uses. 297 In essence, the solution is to create 
a sui generis misappropriation law, a solution recognized by the Nordic 
nations decades ago. 29B 
Congressional Bill S. 2291 offers a promising solution to, and model 
for, the protection of non creative databases based on a doctrine of 
misappropriation particularly tailored to the context of databases. 299 
The current bill clearly recognizes the public interest in the advance 
of knowledge and access to ideas, information and expression. 30o In 
particular, S. 2291 ensures: (1) that uses against the norm underpin-
ning misappropriation include non-commercial approbations such as 
information samaritanism; (2) that sole source data providers may not 
obtain a de facto property right in data that is injurious to the public 
interest; (3) that public interest uses for the non-commercial advance-
ment of knowledge are broadly permissible; and (4) that the protec-
291 See Powell, supra note 122, at 1224-25; Hunsucker, supra note 19, at 703; Reichman, supra 
note I, at 2476; Raskind, supra note 19, at 881 & n.36. 
292 See Karnell, supra note 105, at 67, 70; Reichman, supra note 1, at 2493. 
293 See sources cited supra note 291. 
294 See Kaljala, supra note 21, at 928; Raskind, supra note 19, at 880. 
295 See sources cited supra note 294. 
296 See supra Part LA. 
297 See supra Part LB; supra notes 9, 10 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra Part I1.B. 
299 See supra Part I1LB. 
300 See, e.g., S. 2291, supra note 11, at § 1203(d) and (e) respectively. 
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tions afforded a noncopyrightable database are limited in time. 301 
These features ofS. 2291 ameliorate the legal uncertainty of protection 
under a misappropriation regime and ensure the presence of statutory 
safeguards to protect public interest concerns. This is not to suggest 
that the world should adopt U.S. law wholesale, but only to illustrate 
a pragmatic form for a protection based on a doctrine of misappro-
priation. 
B. S. 2291: Exquisitely Tailored for Database Protection 
l. S. 2291 Prohibits Non-Commercial Misappropriations 
A criticism of protection of noncreative databases under unfair com-
petition law has been that it regulates only behavior between competi-
tors. 302 Although misappropriation falls under the rubric of unfair 
competition law, there is no inherent reason why the norm underpin-
ning the doctrine of misappropriation cannot extend to cover non-
commercial and non-competitor behavior.303 Specifically, such non-
commercial approbations can wreak considerable harm on the 
legitimate interest of the database compiler.304 Accordingly, S. 2291, 
under §§ 1202, 1207(a) (1), clearly prohibits uses and extractions for 
both commercial and non-commercial motives.305 
301 See S. 2291, supra note ll, at §§ 1202, 1207(a)(1), 1205(d), 1203(d), 1206(e), 1207(a)(2) 
and 1208(c) respectively. 
302 See supra Part III.A.2. and note 167 and accompanying text. 
303 See supra note 289. 
304See, e.g., U.S. v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536-37, 540 & n.8, 542-43 (D. Mass. 1994). 
(Involving an MIT student who uploaded commercial software onto electronic bulletin board, to 
be downloaded for free, and encouraged others to do the same. Although unmotivated by any 
desire for financial gain, his actions cost the affected software makers over $1 million in losses). 
305 See, e.g., S. 2291, supra note 11, at §§ 1202, 1207(a) (1). However, to protect individuals who 
use or extract information they legitimately believe to be in the public domain, the application 
of the civil remedies under § 1206 to non-commercial actions should be limited to situations 
wherein the database compiler can show the individual knew or should have known said infor-
mation was protected under § 1202 (for example by a simple notice that said database was 
protected). An appropriate amendment to S. 2291 could be phrased "The court shall reduce or 
remit entirely monetary relief under section 1206(d) in any case in which a defendant believed 
and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her conduct was permissible under this 
chapter and where such conduct was not undertaken for direct or indirect commercial advantage 
or financial gain." 
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2. S. 2291 Limits the Protection Afforded to Sole Source 
Databases 
461 
The central danger and criticism of legal protection for noncreative 
databases is that they create a de facto property right in the database 
contents themselves. 306 This danger is particularly striking in the case 
of scientific data since practically all sources of scientific data are 
unique and non-reproducible and hence arise from a sole source.307 
Accordingly, although S. 2291, as set forth in § 1205(a) in no way 
affects rights, limitations or remedies arising from trade secrets or the 
law of contract, S. 2291 makes clear that it in no way limits the con-
straints imposed by Federal and State antitrust law, especially those 
applicable to sole source databases. 30s Consequently, S. 2291 protects 
compilers from misappropriations for non-public interest uses by free-
riders and information samaritans and ensures public interest users 
significant access to sole source data without the complications of a 
system of compulsory licensing.3og 
3. S. 2291 Broadly Protects Nonprofit Educational, Scientific and 
Research Uses 
The principle norm underpinning copyright protection is to pro-
mote the advancement of knowledge. 310 Accordingly, the protections 
afforded a non copyrightable database should not provide less protec-
tion to uses deemed for the "advancement of knowledge" than those 
available under copyright. However, simple reiteration of a market 
harm test, as in § 1203(d), does not protect such users when they are 
306 See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 2, at 94; Von Simson, supra note 123, at 755-56; see 
also Carson, supra note 160, at 295, 311 (describing how a de facto monopoly over purely factual 
materials may be obtained by embedding them in protectable expression). 
·307 For example, the site context of archeological or paleontological finds is destroyed and 
cannot be reproduced once artifacts are removed. See, e.g., Carson, supra note 160, at 283; supra 
Part LB. Similarly, the observational data of natural phenomena, such as the weather or Landsat 
images of geophysical phenomena, are unique and non-reproducible. See supra Part LB. 
308 See S. 2291, supra note 11, at § 1205(a) which reads in pertinent part: "nothing in this 
chapter shall affect rights, limitations, or remedies concerning copyright, or any other rights Or 
obligations relating to information, including laws with respect to patent, trademark, design 
rights, antitrust, trade secrets, privacy, access to public documents, and the law of contract." 
309 Certainly the substantial weakening of protection for noncreative databases proposed by this 
solution may entail a de facto compulsory license. Nevertheless, this solution does not entangle 
the courts in a determination of the value of a license leaving the compiler and user to determine 
the license's market value in the shadow of the weakened protection for sole source databases. 
310 See sources cited supra notes 43 and 197. 
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the principle market for a sole source database or a "potential market" 
for any database. 311 Accordingly, § 1201 (3) limits the term "potential 
market" to markets that are traditional, reasonable or likely to be 
developed.3J2 In addition, and similar to the approach under the Copy-
right Act, S. 2291 remits or reduces damages in cases of good faith 
violations that involve nonprofit educational, scientific or research 
uses.313 It also makes criminal offenses and penalties inapplicable to 
violations that involve nonprofit educational, scientific or research 
uses, and it provides that costs and fees shall be awarded to educational, 
scientific or research users when actions are brought against them in 
bad faith. 314 
4. S. 2291 Limits Duration of Protection 
Under S. 2291, § 1208(c) protection of noncreative databases is 
limited to fifteen years. 315 This provision lowers the potential for afford-
ing a noncopyrightable database protection exceeding that available 
under copyright, a possibly impermissible act. 316 Both the bill's pur-
pose, to provide incentive for investment in databases, and its concerns 
about public access, require that it limit the duration of protection as 
do the Nordic Catalogue Rules. 317 Further, S. 2291 's fifteen year limit 
facilitates harmonization with the current EU Database Directive or its 
future incarnations.318 Consequently, S. 2291 provides compilers with 
a reasonable time to recoup their investment yet limits the time infor-
mation may be held out of the public domain.3J9 
311 Market harm definitions derived from such indefinate markets as potential ones threaten 
to swallow any exception for uses in the public interest since, arguably, any conceivable market 
is a potential market. 
312 See S. 2291 at § 1201 (3). This limitation is similar to that provided under the Copyright Act. 
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 
920 (2d Cir. 1994). 
mSee 17 U.S.C. § 504 (c)(2) (1994); S. 2291 at § 1206(e). 
314 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2) (1994); S. 2291 at §§ 1206(e), 1207(a) (1) and 1206(d) respectively 
(emphasis added). 
315 See S. 2291, supra note 11, at § 1208(c). 
316 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
317 See, e.g., § 49 of the Swedish Copyright Act of 1960 which reads in pertinent part: "Cala-
logues, tables, and similar compilations in which a large number of particulars have been 
summarized may not be reproduced without the consent of the producer before ten years have 
elapsed from the year in which the production was published." Karnell, supra note 105, at 67-68. 
318 See Database Directive, supra note 32, art. 16(3) (calling for evaluation of sui generis right 
provisions no later than January 1, 2001). 
319 Although, the time necessary for compilers to recoup their investments will vary from 
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CONCLUSION 
Any approach to harmonization of the EU, Japan, the Nordic Na-
tions, the Berne Convention and the United States approaches to 
protection of noncreative databases must find an acceptable basis in 
the philosophical norms of each nation. This Note has inquired into 
which normative principle is best able to achieve the common goal of 
noncreative database protection. 
The approach taken by the EU Database Directive to protect non-
creative databases does not provide an acceptable basis for harmoni-
zation of database protection. The Directive's sui generis property right 
is not compatible with the principles of Japanese, U.S. or international 
copyright law, either in its functional effect or in its normative basis. 
A better approach towards harmonization of non creative database 
protection is based on a doctrine of misappropriation. The norm of 
misappropriation is more compatible with traditional notions of copy-
right and better protects public interest concerns. Towards this end, 
proposed U.S. Congressional Bill S. 2291 offers a promising and prag-
matic model for harmonization of non creative database protection 
based on a doctrine of misappropriation particularly tailored to the 
context of databases. Although it is not suggested that the world should 
adopt U.S. law wholesale, S. 2291 is illustrative of a regime of protection 
that addresses the legitimate concerns of noncreative database compil-
ers yet protects the public interest in the advancement of knowledge 
and access to ideas, information and expression. 
Michael J Bastian 
database to database, fifteen years is a reasonable time given that under current U.S. law patents 
last twenty years from the filing date and the Database Directive sui generis protection nominally 
lasts fifteen years. 
